Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 38

Issue 3

Article 12

1950

Illegality as a Real Defense Against a Holder in Due Course
Fred Charles
University of Kentucky

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Charles, Fred (1950) "Illegality as a Real Defense Against a Holder in Due Course," Kentucky Law Journal:
Vol. 38: Iss. 3, Article 12.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol38/iss3/12

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

KENTUCKY LAw JouRNAL
ILLEGALITY AS A REAL DEFENSE AGAINST A HOLDER
IN DUE COURSE
As a general rule illegality of consideration is not recognized as a defense
against a holder in due course.' However, in most ]unsdictions there is an exception to tls rule when the instrument arises from an illegal transaction which is
declared void by statute. The Kentucky Court of Appeals has adopted this
exception."
A situation which may give rise to such a problem is this: A and B are involved in a gaming transaction, as a consequence of which A gives to B either lus
promissory note or, more commonly, a check. Subsequently, B negotiates the instrument to C, a holder in due course. On proper presentment of the instrument,
payment is refused. C then seeks recourse against B, the payee-indorser, and to
his surprise he finds that B is either insolvent or has absconded. C is therefore
unable to secure satisfaction of the instrument if no recovery is allowed against A.
In this hypothetical situation C will be given no relief under the Kentucky
holdings. He has become a financier of an illegal transaction. Kentucky, by statute, makes every wagering or gaming contract void.' A check or promissory note
comes under the effect of this statute, those instruments being construed under
the Negotiable Instruments Law as formal contracts.'
It is unquestioned that the enactment of such a statute reflects a wholesome
public policy. But, one the other hand, it is also in the public interest that a
holder in due course should be allowed to recover on the instrument he holds
even though it arose from an illegal transaction.
The Negotiable Instruments Law is very thorough and concise in specifying
what constitutes a holder in due course and what position he holds as a result of
that status. To be a holder in due course, one must take the instrument under
the following conditions:
1. That it is complete and regular upon its face;
2. That he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dishonored, if such was the
fact;
3. That he took it in good faith and for value;
4. That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person
negotiating it.'
There is only one specific reference to illegal consideration set forth in the NIL.
That reference states that a person s title to an instrument is defective when such
instrument was acquired for an illegal consideration.' However, if the holder has
no notice of the defect in the title of the person negotiating the instrument, and
if he meets the other requisites for a holder in due course, he then holds the
instrument free from any defect of title of prior parties among themselves and
may enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount against all parties
liable thereon.' Thus, under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law it takes
'3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs, sec. 1676 (3rd ed. 1922).
-Whitaker v. Smith, 255 Ky. 339, 73 S.W 2d 1105 (1934); Levy v. Doerhoefers
Ex'r., 188 Ky. 413, 222 S.W 515 (1920); Alexander & Co. v. Hazelrigg, 123 Ky. 677,
97 S.W 353 (1906).
'KY. R. S. sec. 372.010 (1948). Ky. R. S. sec. 360.020 (1948) is a similar statute
declaring void usurious rates of interest.
4 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. 7 (1926).
56 Ky. R. S. sec. 356.052 (1948).
Ky. R. S. sec. 356.055 (1948).
' KY. R. S. sec. 356.057 (1948).
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no strained construction to conclude that illegal consideration is merely a personal
defense and is not to be invoked when the tainted instrument finds its way into
the hands of a holder in due course.
Did the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law operate as a repeal by
implication of those particular statutes repugnant to its provisions? A majority
of the courts have held that where, prior to the NIL, a statute made a contract
void, even as against a holder in due course, such statute remains in force after
the enactment of the NIL. One of the few cases expressing a contrary rationalization was decided shortly after the passage of the NIL. The opimon in that action
very piognantly states:
we know, moreover, that the great and leading object of the act, not only with Congress, but with the large number of
the pnncipal commercial States of the Umon that have adopted it, has
been to establish a uniform system of lav to govern negotiable
instruments wherever they might circulate or be negotiated. It was
not only uniformity of rules and principles that was designed, but to
embody in a codified form, as fully as possible, all the law upon the
subject, to avoid conflict of decisions, and the effect of mere local
laws and usuages that have heretofore prevailed. The great object
sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute was, to free
the negotiable instrument, as far as possible, from all latent or local
infirmities that would otherwise inhere in it, to the prejudice and
disappointment of innocent holders, as against all the parties to the
instrument professedly bound thereby. This clearly could not be
effected so long as the instrument was rendered absolutely null and
void by local statute

"'

In states where a statute does not expressly or by necessary implication make
the instrument void, but merely declares the instrument illegal or the transaction
out of which it arose illegal, a holder in due course may recover notwithstanding
the illegality." ' The same result is reached in those jurisdictions which give a
"voidable" interpretation to the word "void.""
Those rulings which declare the instrument void ab initio, due to the illegality
in the inception of the instrument, are of one mind in stating that such a construction is essential to a wholesome public policy. They seem to take the attitude
that the prevention of crime is of more importance than the fostering of commerce.
If it were necessary to make a choice between these two alternative policies then
those particular holdings denying the innocent holder a remedy would be justified.
"Plank v. Swift, 187 Iowa 293, 174 N.W 236 (1919); Levy v. Doerhoefer's Ex'r.,
188 K). 413, 222 S.W. 515 (1920); Elkin Henson Grain Co. v. White, 134 Miss. 203,
98 So. 531 (1924); Fisher v. Brehm, 100 N.J. 341, 126 At. 444 (1924); Sabine v.
Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918); Larschen v. Lantzes, 115 Misc. 616,
189 N.Y. Supp. 137 (1921); Farmers' State Bank v. Clayton Nat. Bank, 31 N.M. 344,

245 Pac. 543
192 S.E. 145
Wirt v.
257 Mich. 91,

(1926); Hall v. Mortgage Security Corp. of America, 119 IV Va. 140,
(1937).
Stubblefield, 17 App. D.C. 283, 287 (1900). Accord, Sakon v. Santini,
241 N.W. 160 (1932); Wolford v. Martinez, 28 N.M. 622, 216 Pac. 499

(1923).

" City Nat. Bank v. De Baum, 166 Ark. 18, 265 S. W. 648 (1924); First Nat. Bank
v. Combs, 237 Ky. 834, 36 S. W 2d 644 (1931); Whitman v. Fourier, 233 Mass. 154,
125 N. E. 303 (1919); Winecoff Operating Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 179 Tenn. 306, 165
S. IV. 2d 285 (1942).
1J. Furman Evans Co. v. Bryson, 146 Ga. 278, 91 S. E. 71 (1916); Ranier v. La
Rue, 83 Ind. App. 28, 147 N. E. 312 (1928); Modern Industrial Bank v. Hegeman,
54 N. Y. S. 2d 251 (1945); McCardell v. Davis, 49 S. D. 554, 207 N. W 662 (1926);
Rosenblum v. Gomall, 52 Utah 206, 173 Pac. 243 (1918).
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Little concern, however, is given to the fact that not only could the prevention of
(rime continue to be fostered, but at the same time a cloud could be removed
from the world of commercial paper. This passive attitude is very apparent from
the frequently quoted phrase, "
the disappointment now and then of an
innocent holder of a negotiable instrument would not be as hurtful and injurious
to the best interests of the states as the removal of the ban from gaming contracts."' 2 Does this construction of such a statute" reflect the true legislative intention by doing such a gross injustice to an innocent party? By declaring the
instrument void ab ifitio, the courts may well be giving protection to that which
the legislatures have prohibited. Not only is the holder in due course without a
remedy, but the obligor to the illegal transaction is relieved of all liability on the
instrument. An Oklahoma court used apt phraseology in stating, "The penalty of
one s folly in engaging in a losing and illegal enterprise at cards cannot under the
present state of law be visited on an innocent holder in due course of commercial
papers."" It has been pointed out that every restriction put upon negotiable
paper in an injury to the state for it tends to derange trade and hinder the transaction of business,
In determimng if such a construction of these statutes is conducive toward a
sound public policy, consideration must be given to another phase of this problem.
By declaring the illegal transaction absolutely void, a very tempting stage is set
for the perpetration of a fraud without an illegal transaction ever occurring. Thus,
in the hypothetical situation A and B could connive to put C in such a position
with both sharing in the resulting proceeds.
The only exception to the rule which demes a holder in due course relief on
an instrument which arises from a transaction expressly declared void by statute
is accomplished by way of estoppel. Thus, if the maker or drawer of the illegal
instrument induces the innocent holder to purchase the instrument on the assurance that it is valid and subsisting, the maker or drawer is later estopped from
invoking the defense that it was given for an illegal consideration." Even here
an Illinois case held that where by statute a note given for a gambling transaction
was void, it was void for all purposes, and what the law makes void, estoppel
cannot make valid." However, such a holding is decidedly contrary to the
weight of authority and is not in accord with the theme of the NIL wluch allows
an estoppel to be invoked where the instrument would otherwise be void."
One of the prime objectives sought to be achieved under the Law Merchant
and later under the NIL was the free circulation of commercial paper as a substitute for money. As long as negotiable instruments are subjected to laws foreign
to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law the purpose of the act is to some
extent frustrated. Not only are laws which set up illegalities as defenses against
a holder in due course unjust, but such a practice makes for a destabilizing effect
on commercial paper.
The outstanding objection to giving the holder in due course relief is that
such a holding would tend to remove the ban from the illegality sought to be
prohibited. However, will relieving the violator of his obligation on the illegal
"'Alexander & Co. v. Hazelrigg, 123 Ky. 677 97 S. IV. 353 (1906).
"3See notes 3 and 4, supra.
"Huffman v. Kohn, 167 Okla. 389, 29 P 2d 767 768 (1934).
"Chemical National Bank v. Kellogg, 183 N. Y. 92, 75 N. E. 1103 (1905).
"Pritchett v. Ahrens, 26 Ind. App. 56, 59 N. E. 42 (1901); Blades v. Newman,
19 Ky. L. Rep, 1062, 43 S. IV 176 (1897); See Holzbog v. Bakrow, 156 Ky. 161, 160
S. IV 792. 794 (1913).
I- Kyser v. Miller, 144 Il1. App. 316 (1908).
"KY. R. S. sec. 356.023 (1948); KY. R. S. sec. 356.124 (1948).
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instrument have a deterrent effect on that which is sought to be prohibited? This
can hardly, be answered in the affirmative. The obligor on the illegal instrument
is probably more apt to continue his illegal practices once his immune status is
established. Also, these holdings have a tendency to throw suspicion on negotiable paper and retard its free circulation. These objections coupled with the
fact that it results in hardship and individual injustice to the holder in due course
should be sufficient basis for enforcing the illegal instrument against the maker
or drawer.
It is therefore submitted that the statutes declaring the illegal transaction void,
should be reconciled with the provisions in the NIL to allow a more harmoious
and equitable result. Such a conclusion could be attained by construing those
particular statutes declaring certain contracts void as only applicable to the original
parties to the transaction and their assigns with notice. The manifest purpose of
the NIL to give protection to the holder in due course could then be earned into
full effect. Such a construction would in no manner promote the illegalities sought
to be prohibited, and at the same time the courts would no longer be giving protection to that which the legislatures have prohibited.
FRED CHARLES

